Abstract: Islamic finance has become an integral part of the financial systems of the Muslim-majority countries of Southeast Asia. At the same time, Southeast Asia has witnessed the emergence of new capital market governance practices and arrangements that are both multi-scalar and multi-sited. This article suggests that rather than only looking at the scale and rescaling of capital market governance in the region, more attention needs to be paid to the shifting balances between regulatory expertise, market practice and societal expectations. Indeed, for governance practices to be considered effective, they have to straddle at times competing demands of authority and legitimacy. This dynamic is nowhere as visible as in the case of Islamic finance, which explicitly involves Shariah experts, trained in Islamic law, in its governance structures. This article explores the novel forms of governance to which this new market has given rise. It argues that Islamic finance -rather than the product of privately held beliefs -has become increasingly bound up with the state apparatus. This facilitates the embedding of Islamic financial principles and ethical concerns throughout capital markets in the region. Yet, Islamic finance has also become increasingly submerged within national development and competitiveness agendas.
excesses that were brought to light in the fallout from the crisis, but more generally question the moral fabric of finance, and of economic activity at large, there clearly is a progressive element to them. What is at stake here is the question of whether a principled approach to finance is possible as opposed to the logic of "no alternative" to the principles of the "free market." Islamic finance can offer some insights in this regard, as it explicitly advocates a principled approach to finance to ensure compliance with the Shariah, also commonly known as Islamic law (Rethel 2017) .
At the same time Islamic finance is no longer a niche phenomenon. Islamic finance is a rapidly growing segment of international financial markets. Recent growth rates of Islamic financial assets are estimated to be in the range of 15% to 20% annually; they have reached a share of roughly 1.4% of global financial markets. In Southeast Asia, Islamic finance has made even more significant inroads into domestic financial systems. In Malaysia, a country with a Muslim share of over 60% of the population and which has been at the forefront of developing both its domestic but also the international market for Islamic finance, Islamic finance has captured a share of over 20% of the banking system and more than half of the domestic corporate bond market. Moreover, Malaysia holds a share of more than half of the global sukuk market; sukuk are a financial instrument akin to bonds in conventional finance, but structured so that they comply with the Shariah. In Indonesia, a country in which around two thirds of the population do not yet have an account in the formal financial system according to the most recent World Bank Global Findex Database data and therefore are classified as "unbanked," Islamic finance has nevertheless achieved a share of over 5% of the financial system. Islamic finance is distinctive in that the design and marketing of financial products and services have to comply with the principles of the Shariah, the Islamic jurisprudential body of knowledge derived from the Quran. Stipulations include the prohibition of interest (riba), gambling (maisir) and contractual ambiguity (gharar) (see Vogel and Hayes 1997; ElGamal 2006) . Compliance with these stipulations rules out speculative financial practices such as short selling or margin trading. In this sense and from a post-global financial crisis vantage point, Islamic finance clearly contains progressive elements. Questions of equity, mutuality and social justice are key concerns in Islamic economic thought. As a consequence, Islamic finance seeks to foster risk-sharing and to avoid financial instruments where one party benefits from the other's loss. Moreover, advocates of Islamic finance emphasise that the requirement of linking financial products to real assets gears Islamic finance towards supporting productive economic activity (Zeti 2012) . Islamic finance thus is to be employed in the service of the real economy, not unlike how the role of finance was conceived in the Northeast Asian developmental state-type financial systems described by Johnson (1982) and others. On a global level, in almost all jurisdictions with the exception of Iran, Islamic finance co-exists with what practitioners call "conventional finance" -the mainstream financial system and its regulatory frameworks.
The unique character of Islamic finance poses several challenges when it comes to conceptualising Islamic financial governance practices. First, it unsettles attempts to draw clear lines between public and private and perhaps even civil forms of governance and associated knowledge practices. Drawing on the interpretation of religious texts, the Shariah clearly derives from outside the state and could thus be thought to constitute a "private," that is non-state, form of regulation.
2 Yet, in practice and as will be discussed in more detail below, in the two countries on which this article focuses, namely Indonesia and Malaysia, Shariah governance is deeply enmeshed with statist practices. Second, and related, Islamic finance challenges commonly held understandings as to the character of regulation.
Typically, regulation is portrayed as public constraints imposed on the behaviour of market actors, with the additional caveat that much of international financial law is "soft," that is non-binding and hence difficult to enforce. Yet, financial institutions seeking the designation of being "Islamic" voluntarily subject themselves to another layer of regulation and public scrutiny. This is not unlike the case of palm oil discussed by Nesadurai (2018) in this issue.
Third and following from this, Islamic finance and its associated governance practices challenge dichotomous understandings of the "local" and the "regional/global." As a universal religious code, the Shariah is clearly global in intention, aimed at safeguarding the welfare and prosperity of the ummah, the global Muslim community. It could thus be thought of as a clear example of "transnational" regulation superseding national boundaries. Yet, in practice, Shariah governance is bound up in idiosyncratic local practices and organisational structures, which impose significant limits on more recent efforts to harmonise Shariah governance across the region, if not globally. To summarise, looking at the multiple levels at which the Shariah governance of Islamic finance operates generates insights into the ongoing rebalancing of state-market-society relations and how they are governed in Southeast Asia more broadly.
The argument of this article unfolds in four steps. 3 The next section situates Islamic finance vis-à-vis discussions of the emergence of more networked types of financial governance in Southeast Asia. In so doing, it will look at both the sites of Islamic financial governance, more specifically the role of state institutions, market practices and religious actors, and the scales of financial governance in the region. The section thereafter looks at the various models of Shariah governance of Islamic finance, specifically of capital markets, that operate in Malaysia and Indonesia. It traces how this type of financial governance has become institutionalised in these national contexts, as well as variations across the two countries and over time. The subsequent section focuses more squarely on how Islamic capital market governance practices are situated vis-à-vis the governance of other Islamic affairs and how they effectively constitute a rebalancing of relations between state, market and religion, albeit in distinctive ways in the different national contexts. This is followed by a section that focuses more on the scales and rescaling of Islamic financial governance including an emerging regional dimension that manifests itself in particular through efforts to harmonise Shariah governance via more and less formal networks of Shariah scholars, and via the regional ambitions of market actors. The final section reviews the core arguments of this article and concludes.
ISLAMIC FINANCE: NEW MARKET, NOVEL FORMS OF GOVERNANCE
In the wake of the financial crisis of 1997-1998, financial (Warde 2010, 70-85) .
The requirement that Islamic financial products and services comply with the principles of Islamic law has given rise to a somewhat unique governance challenge: how to ensure Shariah compliance in both form and substance? In its most basic form, this challenge is addressed by asking religious experts to confirm the Shariah-compliance of any given product that is to be labelled "Islamic." However, from this basic precept, a more complex body of national and even transnational governance arrangements has emerged to both ensure Shariah compliance and foster the development of the Islamic finance sector more broadly.
Whilst the emergence of novel forms of governance for a new market is in itself not surprising, what is striking is the strong resemblance that these developing governance structures for Islamic finance bear to the novel forms of governance discussed in this Special
Issue and in the economic governance literature more broadly. In particular two issues stand out in this regard. These are: (i) the growing recognition that successful and not only multistakeholder governance arrangements deliberately bring together diversely situated actors, for example market players, state regulators, representatives from civil society organisations and so on, who command different types of expertise and derive their legitimacy from different sources; and (ii) the preponderance of non-binding rules, soft law and absence of clearly delineated enforcement mechanisms and the challenges associated with this. These two trends are also common to other cases, including Ba's (2018) contribution on maritime safety regimes, Bünte's (2018) case study of mining governance and the palm oil case discussed by Nesadurai (2018) .
The case of Islamic finance is somewhat distinctive in this regard as it explicitly seeks to incorporate the expert knowledge of religious scholars into its governance frameworks.
However, the way this is done differs significantly in the two countries whose experience is subject to scrutiny in this article. To analyse this emerging governance system, a wider range of actors and practices has to be considered than just those within the immediate purview of the state, and within it the financial bureaucracy. Indeed, it is in the analysis of how state institutions interact with other actors and their relevant expertise that important analytical insights can be gained.
In this regard, governance through Shariah boards has emerged as a key mechanism in the Islamic legitimation of Islamic financial products and services. Models of Shariah governance vary across countries as will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
Typically, Shariah boards operate at the firm level, advising financial institutions on the Shariah compliance of the products they develop and market. Here, the Shariah board In a number of countries, including Malaysia and Indonesia as will be discussed in more detail below, there also exist Shariah boards or advisory councils at the national level, which hold the ultimate authority in ruling on what is compliant or non-compliant with the principles of the Shariah. This is meant to ensure consistency of Shariah interpretation and to provide market participants with greater certainty (Lai 2015) . In many countries, a major challenge is to find Shariah scholars who are not only proficient in Islamic jurisprudence but also have a good understanding of how financial markets work (Pollard and Samers 2007) . In some cases this shortage is compounded by regulatory stipulations that mandate that Shariah scholars cannot sit on more than one board per industry (that is banking, capital markets, takaful insurance) to avoid conflicts of interests. These are national limits which do not prevent Shariah scholars to sit on further boards in other jurisdictions and consequently a potentially important dimension of the transnationalisation of Shariah governance.
The legal opinions issued with regard to the Shariah compliance or not of specific
Islamic financial products and practices have the character of a fatwa. In Islamic law, fatawa (commonly also referred to as fatwas) are opinions issued in response to the question of whether a good or activity is haram (prohibited) or halal (permissible) (Devaraj 2005) .
Hence, fatwas are effectively scholarly opinions drawn from the individual scholar's knowledge of the Shariah and the subject matter. Binding on the issuer, fatwas are an inherently "private" form of governance, relying on the voluntary compliance of the person who sought the fatwa with the verdict of the Shariah expert. Once more, one might think, the way that Shariah compliance is ensured strongly resonates with key tenets in the economic governance literature, in particular discussions of "soft law," characterised by its nonbinding, voluntary character (Abbott and Snidal 2000; Brummer 2011 ). Yet, in practice, in Southeast Asia, fatwas have become bound up with the state apparatus, be it either through the entanglement of fatwa making bodies and government agencies, the elevation of certain issues and corresponding fatwas to the level of national interest or the legalisation/codification of fatwas which includes their incorporation into a growing range of regulatory frameworks (Devaraj 2005) . While this has been the case historically for example with regard to personal and family law pertaining to Muslim affairs, the growing importance of Islamic finance extends this into commercial affairs. This is independent of the religious affiliation of the parties entering into an Islamic financial contract. Again, there remain significant differences in how this plays out in the two country cases, which will be discussed in more detail below.
In sum, not only is Islamic finance a relatively new phenomenon, but the way it is governed resonates strongly with the novel and emerging forms of transnational regulation and governance discussed in this special issue. On the one hand, this is manifest in the requirement of having the compliance or not with Islamic law of financial products and services confirmed, or perhaps rather certified, by Shariah experts. On the other hand, this is expressed in the ways that these confirmations actually operate, namely through fatwa. In so doing, the case of Islamic finance speaks clearly to both conceptual and empirical questions about the rescaling of economic governance in Southeast Asia and what this rescaling entails.
The remainder of this article will look at the three dimensions of governance set out by Breslin and Nesadurai (2018) in the introduction of this Special Issue -structure, process and outcome -and how they operate with regards to the governance of Islamic finance, in particular of capital markets, in Southeast Asia. More specifically, it will look at how the Shariah governance of Islamic finance has become institutionalised as a form of public financial regulation in the two country contexts, the extent to and ways in which Shariah board rulings have become codified and translated into regulatory frameworks and more recent efforts to standardise and harmonise mechanisms of Shariah governance not just regionally but also globally.
MAKING THE PRIVATE PUBLIC: INSTITUTIONALISING SHARIAH

GOVERNANCE
Islamic finance operates alongside the conventional financial system and is as such typically subject to the same laws and regulations, both domestically but also with regard to international standards such as capital adequacy rules. However, at the same time compliance with the principles of the Shariah has to be ensured. Effectively, this means that religious actors decide which products and services are permissible and which are not. Following Avant, Finnemore, and Sell's (2010, 2) definition of "governors," they "evaluate and/or adjudicate outcomes," in this case compliance or not with the principles of the Shariah, but do not necessarily embrace the more agenda-setting types of governance, on which typically the financial bureaucracy takes the lead (see Breslin and Nesadurai 2018 Deliberations in DSN-MUI were lengthy when it came to approving new types of contracts, and privileged questions of authenticity rather than market development more generally.
The introduction of national Shariah boards in Indonesia and Malaysia represents a rescaling of both religious and economic governance onto a centralised body. However, the location of this centralised body within, or perhaps in relation to, the state governance apparatus differs. In Malaysia it is situated within the financial regulatory bureaucracy. In Indonesia, it is a separate body with close affinity to both the country's biggest Islamic civil society organisations and the religious bureaucracy. Thus, despite similar efforts at institutionalising a more centralised mode of Shariah governance in both country cases, the ways in which this has occurred reflects specific settlements between the state, market and religious actors. Faith and the compliance of everyday economic activity with Islamic stipulations are no longer the private matter of religiously conscious financial consumers, as the governance of Islamic finance has become increasingly centralised and incorporated in the governance framework of the state apparatus. Nevertheless, variations exist across the two country cases. Whereas in Malaysia, the public regulation of Shariah governance is part of the financial bureaucracy, in Indonesia, it is more intimately tied up with the religious bureaucracy as well as Islamic civil society organisations. Yet, how does the Shariah governance of Islamic capital markets operate in practice in these two country contexts? The next section will look in more details at the work done by SAC-SC and DSN-MUI and how the status of the rulings of these Shariah boards has changed over time.
MAKING SOFT RULES BINDING: CODIFYING SHARIAH GOVERNANCE
The fatwas of the national-level Shariah councils play an instrumental role in the governance of Islamic capital markets in both countries. Fatwas are the products of reasoning by experts in Islamic law; they provide an informed legal opinion about specific issues. Traditionally issued by individual muftis, collective fatwas have become more common and are the norm in Islamic finance. Scholars issuing fatwas need to be knowledgeable of the Quran and
Hadith, but also aware of the views of classical and modern experts in Islamic law as well as Islamic legal theory and previous fatwas. Indeed, fatwas typically set out in much detail the reasoning that led to a specific conclusion. At the same time, knowledge of the subject matter is also crucial. Issuing a fatwa on Islamic finance thus requires a process of double translation: translating a financial market practice into language that can be understood by Shariah experts (who are not necessarily financial market experts) and translating Shariah principles back into market practices. It presents a significant challenge for the composition of Shariah boards in terms of cultures of expertise that seek to meld market practice with religious knowledge and vice versa.
The role of fatwas has evolved from the non-binding legal opinions which they are in traditional Islamic law to instruments of financial regulation. Similar to the challenges of soft law in global financial governance, codification by state actors has played an important part in turning fatwas into binding rules. In so doing, state actors in both countries do not only influence who the addressees of these fatwa are, for example the general public, Islamic financial institutions or even the judiciary, but also the status that is accorded to these fatwas.
However, the role of state actors goes further as they define who can issue capital market National Islamic finance fatwas and the financial regulatory apparatus thus co-exist in a relationship of mutual dependence. Whilst fatwas to varying degrees serve as the bases for regulatory guidelines and laws, fatwa making bodies rely to a significant degree on the state for their status. However, there are also differences in how the state controls and regulates who can make these fatwas: in Indonesia, it is the organisationally independent MUI via its National Shariah Board, whereas in Malaysia it is the SAC-SC which is under the purview of Not only does the emergence of this new form of governance challenge secular understandings of financial regulation, but the ways in which it is implemented in both countries makes it difficult to locate this new form of regulatory authority as squarely being either state or market. Financial market knowledge, more specifically of financial market practice and the structuring of financial products, is undoubtedly a necessary requirement for Shariah boards to work effectively and to be able to reason about and make judgments on the financial products and activities they assess. At the same time, as the Shariah governance of Islamic capital markets has become increasingly part and parcel of the public regulatory system for finance, a disclosure-based system in which Islamic investors actively engage with the Shariah-quality of any given product and the reputation of the scholars on the approving Shariah boards, has been superseded by a regime of certification. In this, the state continues to play an important role both as legislator and in controlling who can act as a Shariah Yet again, the ways in which Shariah governance is entangled with the state apparatus differs in these two countries. Thus, whilst , in an eponymous article, sees
Islamic finance in Indonesia as a matter of "state syariah," the comparison to the Malaysian case demonstrates the relatively greater independence of DSN-MUI, both with regard to where it is located vis-à-vis the state apparatus, especially the financial bureaucracy, and with regard to how it governs as well as its role in the governance of Islamic capital markets. The authority that states grant to national level Shariah councils with all their idiosyncrasies and their fatwas makes it difficult to see how these governance arrangements can be projected onto the regional, if not even global levels. Nevertheless, in recent years there have been renewed efforts to harmonise Shariah governance as will be discussed in the next section. In Indonesia and Malaysia, efforts were undertaken to establish a centralised model of Shariah governance of capital markets at the national level, DSN-MUI and SAC-SC. These bodies are intimately bound up with the financial regulatory apparatus. Nevertheless, differences persist. In Malaysia, the supreme authority on the Shariah governance of Islamic capital markets is organisationally located at the Securities Commission, whereas in Indonesia it resides outside the formal state apparatus, but is implicitly dependent on state support. In both cases, an at times uneasy balance has been achieved between religious establishment and state power. Moreover, not only has the Shariah governance of capital markets become increasingly institutionalised, but there have been concomitant changes in the status of the rulings issued by these governing bodies. Their fatwas are no longer "merely" part of a social/moral code aimed at providing guidance to pious Muslims on how to conduct their everyday economic affairs, but they have been turned into legally binding instruments, either by state fiat as in the case of Malaysia or by codification in financial regulations as in the case of Indonesia.
MAKING THE LOCAL TRANSNATIONAL: HARMONISING OF SHARIAH
GOVERNANCE
Along these lines, we also see tentative steps towards greater harmonisation of Shariah governance, both in terms of market activities and permissible structures, but also with regard to underlying knowledge practices. Greater effort is put into building consensus in support of the expanding industry, where traditionally diversity of Islamic thought was at least to some extent celebrated, and perhaps one of the great strengths of Islamic finance in terms of its progressiveness. What does this mean with regard to developing a more principled, if not progressive approach to financial governance? On the one hand, the fact that Islamic financial governance is increasingly bound up with the state apparatus facilitates the embedding of Islamic financial principles throughout capital markets in the region. This means that Islamic principles and ethical concerns have become a mainstay of the everyday life of financial markets in the region. On the other hand, it is precisely this nexus that allows wider Islamic financial principles of equity, mutuality and social justice to be subordinated to national development and competitiveness agendas. The deliberative work of Shariah boards has been curtailed, to some extent by the sheer amount of material they must digest, but also because market practitioners and regulatory authorities are keen to bring new structures to the market in support of the expanding Islamic finance sector. Form seems to have taken precedence over substance. Taken together, the governance of Islamic finance in Southeast
Asia is another instance of what Hameiri and Wilson (2015, 2) call the "emergence of variegated forms of regional governance that do not take a formal multilateral form but, Islamic finance has arguably made the most progress, both in terms of its share of the financial system and in terms of the range of financial products and services on offer.
2 Sharia can be divided into ibadat (largely personal) and muamalat (community interactions), with financial transactions more closely linked to the latter which means they are reliant on some form of community authority. Thus, "private" does not translate into "individual" in this instance. I thank Afif Pasuni for making me clarify this point.
principles of Shariah in respect of such Islamic securities" ( §2) and authorising the SC to issue specifying guidelines ( §3).
